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Abstract 
Time needed to develop and field new military capabilities is becoming an increasingly 
serious problem. Among other things, development times have steadily increased. In this 
paper, we attempt to structure the schedule estimating problem, present some initial results, 
and propose a research agenda to improve schedule estimating. Accordingly, we seek 
preliminary answers to the following questions. 
• What is the current state of the art for estimating acquisition program schedules? 
What should it be? 
• What are salient features of program management trade-offs, especially between 
schedule and cost (which are related in complex, imperfectly understood ways)? 
In what areas should air combat performance measures need updating? 
• What are the elements of a research agenda for learning more about schedule 
estimating? 
We also present some preliminary results in the form a narrative case study of the F-35 
program and empirical estimates of schedules.  
The JCIDS (Joint Capability Integration and Development System) Instruction recommends 
“effective cost, performance, schedule and quantity trade-offs” as being highly conducive to 
successful acquisition programs (CJCS, 2015, p. A-9). However, these attributes have 
received rather unequal interest—with cost garnering the most attention. 
For example, in the DoD’s latest acquisition performance report (DoD, 2015), “cost” appears 
18 times in the table of contents and 86 times in the highlights; “schedule” appears six times 
in table of contents and 37 times in the highlights. (“Operational performance” appears only 
six times in the contents.) In our conference program, “cost” appears 14 times in five 
sessions, while “schedule” appears four times, in one session. 
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Cost is certainly important, and warrants much attention, which it’s received. The DoD has 
devoted considerable time, attention and resources to more realistic cost estimating. And, 
seems to us, there’s been a great deal of progress toward that goal. 
But schedule is also important and is becoming more so. With multiple Revolutions in Military 
Affairs ongoing simultaneously, we have entered a hyper-adaptive era in military affairs—
enabled, inter alia, by rapid advances in information technology. As Deputy Secretary Work 
has stated, innovators now encounter “fast followers” (Freedburg, 2015). Accordingly, the 
operational implications of longer schedules have indeed become more important. And the 
DoD’s leadership recognizes that importance. A number of organizations have recently been 
created in order to field new capabilities more quickly.  
In short, major changes in international military affairs and recent DoD emphasis has created 
a new environment, in which an ability to understand the schedule consequences of program 
strategies is especially important. 
Accordingly, we discuss the matter of acquisition schedules within the context of 
contemporary military affairs below. Then we address schedule estimating tools and 
schedule estimating methods. In the section following that, we take the JCIDS instruction 
literally, and essay an abstract discussion of cost-time-performance trade-offs.  
One promising variable for schedule estimating relationships is system performance, which is 
discussed next—primarily in the context of tactical fighters, the F-35 in particular.  
The section titled Toward Explaining the Time Curve1 is about empirical models for estimating 
schedules. One likely schedule driver is requirements growth. In a following section, we offer 
a narrative concerning the requirements growth that occurred from CALF (Common 
Affordable Lightweight Fighter) to JSF (Joint Strike Fighter, F-35). Finally, we offer concluding 
comments and thoughts about a research agenda aimed at making more realistic schedule 
estimating tools available to our acquisition professionals. 
Introduction 
Why Schedules Are Important 
“The fact is that we are slower than the bad guys.”  
—Esti Peshin, Director of Cyber Programs for Israel Aerospace Industries 
(quoted in Sternstein, 2015). 
Cost and schedule are critical variables in any acquisition program. And the DoD has 
indeed committed serious efforts over an extended period of time to develop the means for 
realistic acquisition cost estimates.  
There are at least five good reasons for increased focus on realistic schedule 
estimates: 
 Planning to pay for force modernization in an era of restrained budgets, 
especially in the next decade; 
 Longer times to field new capabilities (absolute and relative); 
 Rapid fielding initiatives throughout the DoD; and 
                                            
 
 
1 That is, the upward trend in time needed to field new systems. 
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 Current marching orders, including the Air Force “should-schedule” initiative. 
(Apparently) Looming Budget Squeeze 
There’s a budget squeeze for the DoD expected in the 2020s, driven largely by 
modernization programs. This has been well documented by experts both inside and outside 
the government (e.g., Congressional Research Service [Gertler, 2015]; Center for Strategic 
and International Studies [Harrison, 2016]). 
This is especially difficult for the Air Force, whose top-3 priority acquisition programs 
account for almost all of resources expected to be available for modernization. For example, 
these (KC-46, F-35, Long-Range Strike Bomber), plus C-130J and unmanned aircraft 
account for 99% of the service’s aircraft acquisition budget for FY16 (Gertler, 2015, 
Summary, 1), with the situation continuing throughout the 2020s. 
Furthermore, there’s every reason to expect budget squeezes to continue well into 
the future. The entitlement bills are now coming due—expected to account for about 15% of 
GDP in 2026. Net interest on the federal debt is estimated at 3%; “discretionary” 
expenditures for about 5%, about half of which is estimated for defense (Congressional 
Budget Office [CBO], 2016, esp. pp. 66, 84). Revenues are estimated at about 18% of GDP 
(CBO, 2016, p. 92), with long-term deficits of about 5% of GDP. This means major pressure 
on the “discretionary” categories—defense especially. 
Therefore, some preplanning and painful prioritizing seems both necessary and 
inevitable. A number of options are available, none of them pleasant (Gertler, 2015; Hale, 
2016; Harrison, 2016). And it’s reasonable to expect that the longer necessary decisions are 
postponed, the range of alternatives available will continue to narrow. But without 
reasonably good program schedule estimates, any early decision loses credibility and 
usefulness. 
Schedules Have Become More Important: Time to Deliver New Systems Is Increasing 
“(Acquisition) lead time in the U.S. is too long,” according to LTG Arthur Trudeau, 
Army Chief of Research and Development (1958, quoted in Peck & Scherer, 1962, p. 425). 
But lead times are getting longer. For example, the F-35 concept is generally regarded as 
being formed in July 1993, with the creation of the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) 
program (Defense Science Board [DSB], 1994, ES-1). The F-35B, for example, was 
declared operational on July 31, 2015 (USMC, 2015), meaning a lead time of 22 years.  
This is illustrated in Figure 1. One implication is that the widely-mentioned 2030 IOC2 
of a next-generation fighter aircraft appears fanciful at best. If source selection for a sixth-
generation fighter aircraft occurs in 2020 (optimistic), we can expect an IOC some time past 
the middle of the 2030s. 
Schedules Are Becoming More Important in an Era of Faster Followers 
As Robert Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, put it, we’re in an era of “fast 
followers” in military affairs (Freedburg, 2015). And there’s excellent reason this problem is 
                                            
 
 
2 Fielding a new fighter in 2030 has been advocated as an operational “requirement” (Gen Mike 
Hostage, quoted in Mehta, 2012) and also to alleviate fighter aircraft shortfalls (Tirpak, 2009, 38). 
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getting worse; as an Air Force flag officer put it, “Emerging threats’ timelines are decreasing. 
(Our) acquisition times are increasing.”3 
The current schedule difficulty is made more acute due to the adaptiveness of our 
rivals. Given especially the extended period of development for many U.S. weapon systems, 
those countermeasures have time to development. Thus, for example, potential adversaries 
have seriously pursued countermeasures to U.S. stealth fighters (e.g., Fulghum, 2012; 
Keller, 2016; Majumdar, 2014; Sweetman, 2015c, 2015d). The principal enabling technology 
is rapid computing, which can combine fragmentary sensor information into a unified picture 
(Clark, 2014). All in all, stealth may indeed be overrated (as the CNO, Admiral Jonathan 
Greenert, stated, quoted in Hasik, 2016a). 
 
 The Time Curve in Months to IOC vs. Source Selection Year for Tactical 
Fighters 
(expanded from Blickstein et al., 2011, Table 4.5, p. 48) 
This is relevant to schedules. It’s possible that a stealthy aircraft, if delayed long 
enough, can operate only at considerably reduced effectiveness (Franck et al., 2012, p. 68). 
Therefore, it’s important that new capabilities, and upgrades, be fielded in a timely manner 
and that planners have a realistic estimate of how long it will take to field new combat 
capabilities.  
Current Marching Orders Regarding Schedules 
Recognizing the problems discussed above, the services and the DoD have 
undertaken initiatives to field new capabilities sooner. These have included the Air Force 
Office of Rapid Capabilities (RCO) and OSD’s Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO). The RCO 
began in 2003; its basic purpose is to accomplish “expedited and operationally focused 
concept-through-fielding activities to support immediate and near-term needs” (Clark & 
                                            
 
 
3 Observation offered at a symposium in May 2015, not for attribution. 
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Freedburg, 2016; U.S. Air Force, 2009). In addition, the Navy has proposed an office which 
will “be something that closely mirrors the Air Force RCO,” according to the Navy’s senior 
acquisition officer (Clark, 2016).  
The SCO originated in 2012. Its basic purpose is “to re-imagine existing DoD and 
intelligence community and commercial systems by giving them new roles and game-
changing capabilities to confound potential enemies (with) the emphasis … on rapidity of 
fielding” (Carter, 2016; Clark & Freedburg, 2016). In addition, an ongoing legislative 
initiative, associated with Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-TX), is intended to streamline acquisition 
processes (Hasik, 2016b). 
Also, Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James (2015) has begun the “should 
schedule” initiative: “The previous incentive focused on cost, now we‘d like to target delivery 
time. … If we can collectively beat the historical developmental schedules and reward the 
behavior in government and industry that speeds things up, we have a real chance to make 
a difference.” 
To implement the “should schedule,” Secretary James proposes, inter alia, that 
schedule be a major factor in source selections: “If an industry partner can propose a 
solution that credibly offers a way to accelerate successful EMD, then that company would 
have a competitive advantage for the award” (James, 2015).  
This sounds good, but let’s consider a future acquisition scenario. Suppose a major 
acquisition program involves proposals, from Firms A and B, and that Firm A wins the 
competition. Let’s further suppose that estimated schedule is a major factor in that decision. 
Finally suppose this particular program involves a long-term, high-value, winner-take-all 
contract—like many competitions these days. And it’s a safe bet that Firm B will protest.4 
While “any accelerated EMD plan would need to survive a detailed scrub by independent 
engineers” (James, 2015), that might well not be enough. At minimum, those proposed 
schedules should also survive a detailed scrub by the GAO.  
On Schedule Estimating Methods 
Program schedule time can be analyzed and forecast according to the following 
(non-inclusive) menu:  
 Schedule length arising from an orderly relationship involving key variables; 
 Schedule as a result of a series of management decisions intended to 
produce the best outcome with respect to performance, cost and time; 
 Schedule resulting from the interactions among a set of tasks needed to 
complete the program. 
We know quite a bit about the last item—through, for example, Program Evaluation 
and Review Technique, Critical Path Method and Gantt Charts (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 
2006, esp. Chap. 11; Defense Systems Management College [DSMC], 2001). 
                                            
 
 
4 The protest may or may not have a convincing rationale. See, for example, Bill Sweetman’s (2015e) 
analysis of the Boeing-Lockheed Martin protest of the LRSB source selection. 
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We know less about the second but can learn more through case studies (as 
discussed below), and official post-mortems like those conducted for cost problems by the 
OSD’s Office of Program Assessment and Root Cause Analysis (PARCA) office.5 
We know some things about the first, through descriptive analyses such as illustrated 
in Figure 1. And we can do more to improve empirical methods. Along those lines, the 
discussion below provides an interesting empirical analysis of schedule lengths. 
It’s possible to formulate an orderly-relations approach in a manner similar to 
formulating Cost Estimating Relationships. We offer the term “Schedule Estimating 
Relationships.” We already have a fair number of possibilities for key explanatory variables. 
These include the following:  
 risk reduction measures (including those prior to source selection); 
 contract type; 
 technical maturity of subsystems and components; 
 requirements growth (or not); 
 “complexity” and “density”; and 
 funding instability (or not). 
Worth noting is that some (perhaps all) items on this list could also apply to program 
cost estimation. 
There’s nothing original here; the first four items have been publicly cited as lessons 
learned and applied to the LRSB program (Butler, 2015; Seligman et al., 2015; Sweetman, 
2015d; Tirpak, 2015). In addition, below, we discuss requirements growth in the F-35 
program. 
“Complexity” is suggested as an explanatory variable by a particularly interesting 
comment by a senior DoD official: “Our complexity reach exceeds our engineering grasp.”6 
One plausible metric for complexity is lines of code (virtual complexity perhaps). For 
example, Hallion (1990) reports 64,000 lines of code in the F-15A and 2.4 million lines in the 
F-15E. Lines of code in the F-35 vary with source and date. A 2014 CRS report estimates F-
35 software as containing approximately 29 million lines of code and still growing (Gertler, 
2014, p. 14). 
In addition to virtual complexity, we could consider “density,” indicating physical 
complexity. Density is “how tightly systems and equipment are placed within a hull structure” 
(Grant, 2008). There is other interesting research on “density” as a cost driver for warships 
(e.g., Terwilliger, 2015).  
                                            
 
 
5 In fact, post-mortem analysis of schedules arguably fits directly within the PARCA charter. 
(http://www.acq.osd.mil/parca/performance-assessments.shtml). 
6 Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, May 2012, Monterey, CA. Comment understood as 
not for attribution. 
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Schedule Estimating Goals 
We think that something like the current structure for cost estimates is a useful 
analog in thinking about a similar structure for schedule estimates. This is illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
 
 Schedule Estimation by Program Phase 
(adapted from Blanchard & Frabrycky, 2006, Figure 17.9, p. 595) 
Note. Source draft referred to cost estimation by program phase. 
In that vein, a comprehensive schedule estimating repertoire would include the 
following: 
 macro-level, statistical methods to do those estimates in the early stages of 
the program (ex ante),  
 more specific methods to update schedule estimates during the program (in 
media res), and  
 methods for explaining the results of events and decisions previously in the 
program (ex post).  
For estimates done early in the program, we think “Schedule Estimating 
Relationships” featuring historically important schedule drivers are promising. They can 
provide preliminary estimates of acquisition schedules to inform concept and requirements 
determination. They could also serve as an independent check of scheduling aspects of 
bidders’ proposals. 
During program execution, it’s highly desirable for program managers to have the 
means to update schedule estimates. To a considerable extent these already exist, as 
discussed, for example, in the DAU’s Scheduling Guide for Program Managers (DSMC, 
2001). A number of tools (discussed above) are available to program managers and their 
staffs (Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2006, esp. Chaps. 11 & 18).  
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Finally, schedule analysis and prediction methods can usefully support after-the-fact 
(ex post) analyses of program successes and difficulties. Such tools could enable schedule 
analyses similar to those now conducted by the OSD’s Root Cause Analysis office for 
selected programs with cost problems. 
Cost–Performance–Schedule Trade-Offs 
Schedules arise from trades (perhaps implicit) among cost, schedule and 
performance. And “making … effective cost, performance, schedule, and quantity trade-offs” 
(emphasis added) is a major theme of the JCS directive for the Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System (JCIDS; CJCS, 2015).  
We know a fair amount about the structure of cost, performance, and schedule trade-
offs, but there’s more worth finding out. As one report put it, “the literature linking cost, 
performance, and schedule is by no means abundant. This is due in large part to the sheer 
complexity of the interrelations between performance characteristics and technical 
specifications, as well as the unique missions … systems” (Voltz, 1992, p. 13). In this 
section, we offer a preliminary explanation of those trade-offs taken two at a time: Cost and 
Performance; Cost and Schedule; Performance and Schedule. 
Cost and Performance 
Of these three, we probably know most about Cost vs. Performance. Basically, we 
expect to pay more to acquire higher performance. Figure 3 shows a notional trade-off with 
effects of technical progress. 
That relationship has been investigated in a number of empirical studies. One of 
those (Hildebrandt & Sze, 1986, p. 15) led to the following cost-performance relationship (in 
log-log form) shown below. This is the result of a regression analysis of a data base of 66 
fighter and attack aircraft with first flights from 1950 (F-89) to 1979 (F/A-18).  
lnCAC = 1.99 + ln*P + 1.31ln*ASP - .31lnR - .03T - .50*ATTACK - .89*M0D + bi*lnY, (1) 
where CAC is cumulative average cost; P is resource price levels (primarily labor 
and materials); ASP is an aircraft performance index; R is production rate; T is year of first 
flight; ATTACK is dummy variable (1 for attack aircraft, 0 otherwise); MOD is a dummy 
variable for aircraft models that are modifications or upgrades of an existing aircraft type; bi 
is the relevant learning curve parameter; and Y is cumulative production. Franck (1992) 
used the same data to infer patterns of cost-performance design choices. 
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 Cost vs. Performance Trade-Off 
(adapted from Gansler, 1987, p. K-8; Sullivan, 1981) 
The first-flight variable is intended to capture the effects of technical progress. All 
other things equal, we expect to pay less for a given level of performance with 
improvements in technology. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which includes effects of 
technical progress. As previously stated, as performance increases, so does cost. However 
advancing technology shifts the cost-performance curve down and to the right (lessening to 
cost of any given level of performance).  
Program Schedule and Cost 
Effect of development time on program cost is somewhat ambiguous. Keeping a 
team in place longer means greater overhead expenses (sometimes called the “standing 
army” effect). But shorter development times can mean less chance to develop technology 
and sort among alternative approaches and incurring the costs associated with cascading 
effects of wrong turns. 
These seem, in general, to be countervailing effects. Less time means less overhead 
cost over the life of the program. More time means better chances to avoid pitfalls and 
manage risk. In theory, the best course of action is reached by balancing increases in 
overhead (indirect) cost with direct program cost. This is shown in Figure 4. 
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 Total Cost Analysis for Selecting Optimum Program Duration 
(adapted from DSMC, 2001, p. 60; Zschau, 1969, pp. 28–30) 
This sketches nicely, but solving the implied problem is more complicated. For 
example, not all relevant costs are internal to the acquisition program itself. As the DSMC 
Scheduling Guide points out, “Each month added to the development and production of a 
new … system tends to reduce by 1 month the operational life of the product” (DSMC, 2001, 
p. 61). This suggests that monetized effects of fielding delay should be added to total 
costs—a difficult task. 
Nonetheless, those costs of delay can be all too real and multifaceted, as illustrated 
by the F-35 program. The effects included a projected shortfall of tactical fighters in both the 
Air Force and Navy (Tirpak, 2010; Trimble, 2010). To help bridge that gap, it was necessary 
to keep the older “legacy” aircraft in service for longer than originally planned—and 
consequently spend more money than originally planned to retard their rate of 
obsolescence. For example, the U.S. Air Force has been obliged to devote considerable 
resources to upgrading its “legacy” fourth-generation systems and to extending their 
operational lives (GAO, 2012). Overall, “the failure of the so-called fifth-generation fighters 
… to arrive on time and on cost has cascading effects throughout U.S. and allied fighter 
forces” (Sweetman, 2012).  
Schedule and Performance 
A notional representation of system performance vs. program time appears in Figure 
5. The figure implies that increasing program time allows for a more considered approach 
that permits better decisions. However, increases in indirect cost caused by a longer 
program crowd out resources directly useful for system development. And beyond some 
point, the slope of the Performance vs. Time curve goes negative. 
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 Performance vs. Development Time Trade-Off 
(adapted from Zschau, 1969, pp. 28–30) 
While certainly understandable in the abstract, there are some difficulties with this 
trade-off in practice. Among other things, development programs that proceed with a strictly 
fixed budget are very rare, if not nonexistent. This limits opportunities to develop a model 
grounded in actual experience. 
The Concurrency Issue 
Program “concurrency” is generally understood to involve beginning production prior 
to completion of development testing (DoD, 2015, p. 46), or more broadly as “combining or 
overlapping phases” (“Concurrency,” n.d.). 
Concurrency is frequently cited as a “high risk strategy that often results in 
performance shortfalls, unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, and test problems” 
(GAO, 2012). On the other hand, Goure (2015) noted “a number of reasons to pursue 
concurrency,” including early identification of production problems and faster fielding of new 
hardware. 
One very interesting study suggests an optimum level of concurrency (from the 
perspective of cost). However, the authors did not find strong empirical evidence to support 
that hypothesis (Birchler et al., 2011, p. 252). Nonetheless, some form of dynamic, 
simultaneous-equation model might prove useful. 
Measuring Performance 
Metrics for cost and schedule time are generally well understand. Metrics for 
performance are much less definite. Generally system “performance” is reported as a vector. 
For tactical fighters, the elements of the vector are characteristics such as maximum speed, 
service ceiling, thrust-to-weight ratio, combat range, weapons carriage, and Radar Cross 
Section (RCS). One noteworthy effort to develop performance indices (scalar measures) for 
a variety of combat system types was undertaken by the Analytic Sciences Corporation 
(ANSER). This occurred mostly in the 1980s and described as the TASCFORM method 
(Regan & Voigt, 1988). 
Within that overall project, the TASCFORM-Air model of combat capability was 
intended to assess tactical fighters, attack helicopters, and bombers in various conventional 
missions (Regan & Voigt, 1988, p. 1-1). Tactical aircraft were assessed in the context air-to-
air (“air combat”) and “surface attack” against both land and maritime targets (p. 2-2). The 
basic intent of TASCFORM-Air was to systematize observable technical features and 
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combine those with judgments of air combat experts to provide (scalar) indices of fighter 
capability in several operational contexts. 
The capability measures applied directly to individual aircraft are organized in a 
hierarchy: 
 Weapon Performance (WP, a function of weapons carriage, range, 
maneuverability and speed); 
 Weapon System Performance (WSP, WP plus target acquisition, 
susceptibility to countermeasures, weapon enhancements, navigation and 
survivability) 
 Adjusted Weapon System Performance (AWSP, WSP plus “obsolescence” 
and sortie rate; p. 2-4). 
So, how does the F-35 performance look relative to fourth-generation fighters? A 
comparison of the aircraft types in the Weapons Performance dimensions (which emphasize 
payload, range, maneuverability, and speed) shows there’s not much difference. 
 Hard points: F-35 has a comparable number of weapons hard points relative 
to the F-18 and F-16 but much fewer in stealth mode. 
 Max Speed: all three aircraft are all comparable.  
 Ferry Range is comparable, if F-35 has external tanks. 
 There’s a Combat Range advantage for the F-35 when operating in a high-
high-high profile, compared with range in a high-low-high profile for the 
fourth-generation fighters. 
 Maneuverability: Thrust-to-weight ratio, max Gs, and wing loadings are 
comparable for F-16, F-18, and F-35. 
 Sortie Rate: not yet determined. The F-35 is still maturing. 
 Survivability: favors stealthy aircraft, but nonetheless subject to 
countermeasures (discussed above). 
Force capability is generally presented as numbers and types of systems. Force 
capability indices are also discussed in TASCFORM (pp. 2-4, 2-30–2-36), in which force 
capability is assumed to be the sum of individual performance (by tail number). These 
measures do not fully address force effectiveness as a function of networking and shared 
situational awareness. 
The fifth-generation fighter advocates have a new perspective on system and force 
capabilities. New aircraft models such as the F-22 and F-35 are seen as disruptive 
innovations. Within this perspective, the operational capabilities of the fifth generation are 
due to the combination (synergy perhaps) of airframe characteristics and “ability to work 
within and interact with a broad array of networked systems” (Deptula, 2011; Space Daily 
Staff, 2006). 
Moreover, fifth-generation characteristics, especially stealth, increase the proportion 
of resources devoted to offensive air operations. Fifth-generation aircraft likely need fewer 
fighter sorties to support penetration of advanced and integrated air defenses, and fewer 
tanker sorties (due to smaller strike packages).  
Regardless of one’s opinion of fifth-generation performance advantages, it’s hard to 
avoid the conclusion that a credible method of measuring system (and force) performance 
should account for the advantages of stealth, shared battlefield awareness, and networked 
operations. 
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F-35: From CALF TO JSF7 
The Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF, Lightning II) is a single seat, 
single engine, fifth-generation multirole fighter designed to perform ground attack, 
reconnaisance, and air defense missions while in stealthy operation. It was originally 
visualized as a relatively affordable strike fighter available in three largely common versions 
for the Air Force, Marines, and Navy. It didn’t work out that way.  
Then-Major General Christopher Bogdan (JSF Program Executive Officer designate) 
commented that the F-35 “is not a single program (but rather) three separate airplane 
programs (with) common avionics and a common engine.” He also stressed the difficulties 
involved in reaching agreement on decision-making. In his words, “It‘s hard enough to get 
one service to answer questions about requirements. Imagine three services, eight partners, 
and two FMS customers” (Bogdan, 2012). 
All three models are designed for limited supersonic operation, and to carry their 
primary weapons internally, to preserve their stealth characteristics. Although physical 
differences arose from methods of takeoff and landing, requirements were also driven by 
different operational needs.  
The F-35A was a replacement for the F-16, the A-10, and perhaps the F-15 fighter. 
In addition, it is intended to complement the F-22 air superiority fighter. The Air Force sought 
an advanced attack aircraft with stealth, advanced avionics, and low life-cycle operating 
costs providing improved range, speed, and appreciable weapons load capacity.  
The F-35B is a short takeoff and vertical landing aircraft (STOVL) acquired to replace 
its AV-8B Harrier and its F/A-18A/B/C/D strike fighters. It was designed to operate from 
forward battlefields, helicopter carriers, and as a “jump jet” from smaller conventional 
carriers. The F-35C (CV) chosen by the U.S. Navy resembled the Air Force’s F-35A but was 
modified for carrier operations. It is intended to replace earlier versions of the F/A-18. 
Joint and International Nature 
At the time of JSF conception, there was a clear preference at the highest levels of 
the DoD for joint projects. Typically, the rationale for jointness is that a largely joint project 
lessens costs of developing, procuring, and operating and supporting some large number of 
separate aircraft designs with similar (but not necessarily identical) requirements.  
A study by the RAND Corporation undertook to examine this issue (Lorell et al., 
2013), which focused on the costs of jointness. The critical finding is  
the need to accommodate different service requirements in a single design or 
common design family leads to greater program complexity, increased 
technical risk, and common functionality … beyond that needed for some 
variants, potentially leading to higher overall cost, despite the efficiencies (of 
common design). (Lorell et al., 2013, iii) 
                                            
 
 
7 This section relies in part on background information from Aboulafia (2015) and Gertler (2014). Also 
we found the Wikipedia article on the F-35 to be a good source for those seeking basic information on 
the program (“Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II,” n.d.). 
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The F-35 won the DoD source selection, with an industry team of Lockheed, 
Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, and Pratt & Whitney. (Aboulafia, 2015, identified the F-
35 suppliers in more detail.) 
From the earliest days of the JSF project, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
stressed international participation. The UK joined the JSF project as a Level 1 Full 
Collaborative Partner. There were five (Level II) Associate Partners and three (Level III) 
Informed Partners in the Systems Development and Demonstration Phase (Schreiber, 2002, 
p. 164).  
History and Antecedents 
Defense procurement funding fell sharply in the early 1990s, implementing the 
Bottom Up Review recommendations—ending such programs as the NATF (Naval 
Advanced Tactical Fighter) and the A-12/ATA. Fearing loss of domestic military aircraft 
design skills, the DoD undertook a series of largely unsuccessful programs. This effort 
include support for design of advanced technology aircraft available for production.  
The list of aircraft concepts not leading to production includes the following (e.g., 
Aboulafia, 2015, esp. pp. 10–11): 
 A-X/A/F-X, a Navy-dominated joint program was canceled due to the A-12’s 
high cost, and by the 1993 appearance F/A-18E/F (Super Hornet).  
 ASTOVL/SSF (Advanced STOVL/STOVL Strike Fighter) was an ARPA 
project intended to develop a supersonic AV-8B Harrier successor. NASA 
and the UK both participated in this effort. It was merged by Congress with 
JAST in mid-1994.  
 CALF (Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter) was the formal name for 
DARPA’s ASTOVL project that included a conventional take-off design 
capability. Sometimes known as the X-32, CALF was merged into JAST in 
November 1994. 
 JAF (Joint Attack Fighter) explored the same ideas as JAST, as was also true 
of the JSSA, the Joint Stealth Strike Attack Aircraft.  
 MRF (Multi-Role Fighter) was a Navy/Air force program designed to produce 
a follow-on aircraft for the F-16, F/A-18 and several other legacy planes. It 
was sidetracked by the appearance of the F/A-18E/F (Super Hornet).  
JAST/JSF 
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter emerged from the Joint Advanced Strike Technology 
Program (JAST). However, JAST’s original goal was to develop technologies for advanced 
strike aircraft (DSB, 1994). It happened that JAST’s plans to fund several concept 
demonstrator aircraft in 1996 coincided with ASTOVL’s planned timing of the start of its 
Phase III (full-scale flight demonstration). The managements of both programs concluded 
that it would be logical to make JAST the U.S. military service sponsor for the flight 
demonstration phase of ASTOVL. In any case, FY95 budget legislation directed an 
immediate merger of ASTOVL into JAST (DoD, JSF History, 2015). 
In early 1997, Lockheed Martin and Boeing were selected to develop flying airframes 
for the concept demonstration phase. They were designated X-32 (Boeing) and X-35 
(Lockheed Martin), respectively, with evaluations between September 2000 and August 
2001. On October 26, 2001, the Lockheed Martin team was announced as the winner, after 
which the program transitioned to the JSF System Development and Demonstration (SDD) 
phase (Aboulafia, 2015, esp. pp. 11–12). 
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Cost and Scheduling Problems 
Few new weapon systems have earned such a widespread reputation for problems 
encountered in the design and development stages as the F-35. A few comments are useful 
here. Early development problems in many new products were followed by highly effective 
operational performance. The C-17 is one example (Franck et al., 2012). But the F-35 
involved much more difficult design and development problems (Blickstein et al., 2011, esp. 
pp. 42, 49). 
The RAND Corporation and others reviewed the Joint Strike Fighter and provided a 
root cause analysis of its cost problems. The RAND report identified “in some measure” an 
overly optimistic government estimate of the influence of acquisition reform and 
“produceability initiatives” as responsible for underestimates of future procurement cost 
growth. When combined with a perceived strong need for an improved F-16 replacement, 
the OSD proved willing to begin “a technologically complex, highly concurrent F-35 
program.” The end results included schedule slippage and cost growth that resulted in a 
Nunn-McCurdy breach (e.g., Rutherford, 2010).  
Explaining the Time Curve 
In this section, empirical models are discussed that focus on the key variable: 
Months from Initial Award to IOC (or Time to IOC) for fighter aircraft. As shown previously, 
this variable has increased with later initial award years for fighter aircraft. 
In this empirical analysis, contract-level data contained in Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SARs) or the F/A-18E/F, F-22, and F-35 (and, where possible the Air Force F-35A) 
is emphasized. For each published SAR, generally on December 31, both program and 
contract level data are included. Because each SAR for fighter aircraft contain data for two 
or more contracts (both airframe system and engine), data at this level not only increases 
the size of the data set but also permits inclusion of contract type, changes in the target 
cost, years elapsed since time of contract award, and contract variance. Contract variance 
information (not required for Firm Fixed Price contracts) includes both cost and schedule 
variance. The former provides information on the difference between the planned and actual 
contract cost, the latter on the difference between the planned work performed and 
scheduled. (Future analysis will extend this work to include program-level data including the 
various program-level variances.) 
Examination of the available data indicates that complex interactions among the 
relevant variables complicates the traditional regression analysis view of explanatory 
variables affecting the dependent variable. Our analysis includes both explanation and 
association. Including association variables provides insight into the strength of the 
relationships between these variables and the dependent variable (other variables held 
constant). 
We are also investigating professional-judgment measures of fighter effectiveness 
for fighters, which would increase the regressions’ explanatory power. One variable 
obtained from non-SAR sources, included in the current analysis, is the percent of an 
aircraft’s structural weight consisting of composites.  
To understand the empirical analysis, an influence diagram appears in Figure 6—in 
the form of path analysis in which Time to IOC is related to contract-specific cost variance 
and other variables. In turn, current minus initial target cost is related to contract variance 
data, contract type, and several other variables. We also identify the expected signs of the 
regression coefficients when possible. 
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Broadly speaking, Figure 6 displays those variables that directly related to Months 
from Initial Contract Award to IOC, namely Contract Current—Initial Target Price, Program 
Year, SAR Year—Contract Award Year, and Composites as a Percent of AC Structure 
Weight. There are also indirect relationships between certain explanatory variables and time 
to IOC. This occurs through these variables’ direct relationship with [Contract Current—Initial 
Target Price]. The variables with an indirect relationship with time to IOC are Program Year, 
[SAR Year—Contract Award Year], [Contract Cost Variance and Contract Schedule 
Variance], Aircraft MDS, and Contract Type. 
The only variables with uncertain sign of regression coefficients are Aircraft MDS and 
Contract Type. It is likely easiest to understand this diagram through a discussion of the 
regression results. First, Figure 6 shows the direct relationship between explanatory 
variables and Time to IOC.  
 
 Structure of the Regression Model 
The results in Table 1 show all variables being statistically significant given the 
hypothesized signs of the coefficients in the figure. When the current target minus the initial 
target price increases, this likely means that a specification change occurred. One would 
expect specification change to be associated with a longer Time to IOC. As Program Year 
increases, this is likely related to a longer program length. In turn, this is likely related to an 
increase in Time to IOC. An increase in [SAR Year—Contracti Award Year] indicates that a 
schedule delay is likely.  
The most interesting independent variable may be [Composites as a Percent of AC 
Structural Weight]. We show that as this increases, which is exactly what occurred when 
shifting from the F/A-18E/F to the F-22 to the F-35 programs, the dependent variable 
increases. It is known that working with composite materials is more complex than traditional 
materials, and as result, can be expected to increase the length of the program to IOC.  
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 Direct Effects for Months-to-IOC Regression 
 
 
We turn now to the indirect effects regression. We have seen that [Contracti Current 
Target—Initial Target Price] has a positive direct relationship with the key dependent 
variable. But there are also variables that have a direct relationship with [Contracti Current 
Target—Initial Target Price], and, therefore, an indirect relationship with [Months from Initial 
Contract Award to IOC]. Table 2 displays this set of regression results.  
 Indirect Effects in the Regression Model 
 
The Cumulative Contract Cost and Schedule Variance coefficients are interesting. 
Contract Cost Variance Budgeted Cost of Work Performed minus Actual Cost of Work 
Performed; and Schedule Cost Variance equals Budgeted Cost of Work Performed minus 
Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled. So, as these variables both increase, the extent to 
which the contractor is over budget and behind schedule decreases. Therefore, motivation 
to revise target price also decreases, consistent with the negative coefficients. 
As Program Year increases, specifications become more settled, and target price 
revisions are less likely, consistent with the negative coefficient. However, as contracts 
become longer, requirement and specification changes become more likely. 
One advantage of employing both direct and indirect modeling is that one can more 
effectively assess indirect effects of Aircraft MDS and Contract Type on Time to IOC. Both 
the F-35 and the F/A-18E/F are negatively related to [Contracti Current Target—Initial Target 
Price]. For the F-35, this negative coefficient offsets somewhat the positive relationship 
between [Contracti Current Target—Initial Target Price] and [Months from Initial Contract 
Award to IOC]. Finally, we find that CPAF contracts are negatively related to [Contracti 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient t-statistic
(Constant) 50.409 12.478
Contract Current - Initial Target Price ($B) 1.309 2.880
Program Year 2.030 10.015
SAR Year - ContractAward Year 0.986 3.853
Composites as Percent of Structural Weight 3.051 21.242
FFP Contract 12.450 5.920
Dependent Variable: Months from Initial Contract Award to IOC
R2 = 0.846; N = 164
Explanatory Variable Coefficient t-statistic
(Constant) 3.222 3.941
Cumulative Contract Cost Variance -4.810 -4.725
Cumulative Contract Schedule Variance -6.072 -3.339
Program Year -0.213 -3.934
SAR Year - Contract Award Year 0.168 3.506
F-35 -1.333 -3.867
F/A-18E/F -1.979 -4.257
CPAF Contract -0.860 -2.019
Dependent Variable: Contract Current Target - Initial Target Price   
R2 = 0.665; N = 110; Financial Variables, $B
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 112 - 
Current Target—Initial Target Price], likely meaning smaller increase in specifications that, in 
turn, increase target price. 
Draft Research Agenda 
Acquisition schedules are becoming more important. Therefore, our final aim in this 
paper is to propose a research agenda aimed at producing more accurate schedule 
estimates, particularly in major defense acquisition programs.  
Schedule Estimation Research: A Draft List of Questions and Tasks 
1. What is the current state of schedule estimation and control? What’s needed? 
Where are the gaps? 
o Interview subject-matter experts regarding current state of schedule 
analysis, and areas for improvement. 
2. How can operational performance metrics better capture contemporary 
operations? 
o Update performance metrics for information-age warfare. Start with 
some existing method, such as TASCFORM. 
3. What model(s) best capture the trade-offs among program cost and 
schedule, as well as operational capability of fielded equipment? Can those 
models give insight into “troubled programs,” with difficulties in cost, 
schedule, and performance? 
o Analyze previous case studies (e.g., from Kennedy School of 
Government) for insights into program schedule drivers. 
o Publish new case studies dealing with contemporary acquisition 
programs, based, among other things, on a thorough analysis of 
relevant SARs. 
4. What estimating relationships best capture time to field new hardware? What 
schedule drivers are generally most important? 
o Based on available data, formulate and empirically test models with 
hypothesized schedule drivers. 
o Formulate and test prediction markets for cost and schedule 
problems. 
5. Is there a prediction market design that would produce useful information 
about impending cost and schedule difficulties? 
o Design a prediction market for defense acquisition programs. Test it in 
an experimental setting. 
While this is a very ambitious research program, it is readily decomposable into 
smaller projects. And that we were able to significantly advance the cost estimating state of 
the art suggests we can do the same with schedule estimation. Moreover, we’d likely find 
considerable insights from cost estimation methods useful for schedule estimation.  
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